Section 1: Background statement
On behalf of the remuneration committee (the committee), I am pleased to present the 2024 remuneration report, which, in compliance with best practice reporting as recommended by the King IVTM Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa, highlights:
During the period under review, the company implemented a new operating model and appointed new business unit heads to effectively execute on the strategic priorities. The Tiger Brands executive leadership team have focused on initiatives to drive business performance, growth and innovation while proactively navigating very challenging market conditions. The strategic priorities that focused the organisation were:
These priorities are supported by the following key enablers:
Following the appointment of Tjaart Kruger as the chief executive officer in November 2023, the first half of FY24 was focused on reviewing the Tiger Brands operating model and structure with the intent of enabling simplified decision-making, more agile execution as close to the consumer as possible and ultimately a step change in business performance. Six (6) empowered business units accountable for profit and loss performance, each led by a managing director, were established: Milling and Baking, Grains, Culinary, Snacks, Treats and Beverages, Home, Personal Care & Baby and International. The managing directors report directly to the chief executive officer. This simplified the business structure by removing the layer of chief growth officers. Five of the six managing directors were internal appointments, indicating a stronger talent pipeline and succession bench. The business units are supported by enabling functions which are responsible for shaping group-wide standards, processes and guardrails that enable execution of the business strategy and growth agenda. The shared services centres execute finance and people transactional activities, leveraging technology and digital solutions to realise economies of scale.
The change in the operating model has enabled Tiger Brands to execute its strategy with more speed, agility and focus on the consumer despite continuing to operate in a pressurised consumer market, in the context of challenging economic conditions. The company experienced pressure on sales volumes and margins. However, as the operating model and structure settled down and economic pressures eased, the company delivered a stronger second half of the year, with visible signs of recovery reflected in the group's performance, also driven by the turnaround plan which is starting to bear fruit. As a result, the company exceeded the threshold group EBIT target, and as such, made a provision for payment to be made in terms of the short-term incentive (STI) scheme.
The performance value shares (PVS) awarded in December 2021 will vest on 3 December 2024 and 15 December 2024 respectively. For these awards, the HEPS stretch target was exceeded, resulting in a 200% vesting rate of this portion (50% of award). The achievement against the ROIC component exceeded target, resulting in a 85,81% vesting rate of this portion (50% of award). As a result, the overall vesting of the December 2021 award is at 142,91%.
As reported in the previous annual report, the board and Noel Doyle jointly agreed that Mr Doyle step down as chief executive officer. He vacated office on the appointment of the current chief executive officer and proceeded on garden leave until his service termination date of 31 March 2024. The terms of the separation were disclosed in the previous report and the payments made to him, are reflected in the remuneration tables here.
During the period under review, further enhancements were made to the remuneration strategy to improve alignment of critical business key performance indicators (KPIs) to measure and reward performance against our business strategy. As such, the remuneration committee approved the implementation of a revised short-term incentive (STI) scorecard that supports the achievement of key performance indicators. Compared to 2023, the weighting of financial targets was increased to stimulate a significant step change in business performance, however, the committee believes a balance was struck between financial, strategic and sustainability measures.
The committee approved, after consulting shareholders, the implementation of a deferred bonus share plan, where senior management may elect to defer a portion of their STI into deferred bonus shares, which will then be matched by the company on a one-for-one basis. Both the deferred bonus shares and the company matched shares will be classified as restricted shares, that vest after three years.
The committee also approved the inclusion of employees at grades A to CL in the short-term incentive scheme. All employees are now eligible to earn a short-term incentive based on performance under the rules of the STI scheme, except where wage agreements determine otherwise. This is a further step in our journey towards inspiring winning performance across all our teams and at all levels of the organisation.
Our environmental, social and governance (ESG) strategy continues to be executed across our operations and associated targets to drive and measure how the ESG performance have been established. To this end, the remuneration committee approved an ESG key performance indicator (KPI) – percentage reduction in carbon emissions – and associated target for inclusion in the FY24 short-term incentive scheme scorecard (see here FY24 group and business unit performance factors, and here executive directors performance scorecard FY24).
The committee noted and considered the amendments to the Companies Act, announced by the president in July 2024. Once the amendments come into effect, the company will report in accordance with the Act's provisions.
The remuneration committee maintains strong relationships with shareholders and strives towards high standards of disclosure of our remuneration approach to ensure that there is a clear understanding of our remuneration policy and the practices that have been adopted. The non-binding advisory votes by shareholders for the past four years are summarised as follows:
% vote in favour | February 2024 |
February 2023 |
February 2022 |
February 2021 |
Remuneration policy | 96,64% | 73,70% | 91,55% | 89,20% |
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Remuneration implementation | 97,33% | 53,81% | 96,94% | 82,24% |
The remuneration policy and the implementation report achieved the requisite threshold of 75% non-binding advisory approval. However, the special resolution relating to non-resident non-executive director fees did not achieve the requisite voting outcome at 65,37%. Tiger Brands is committed to continuous and robust shareholder engagement. To this end, key shareholders were engaged in response to voting outcomes. The outcomes of these engagements are addressed in the following section.
The remuneration committee chairman, the chairman of the board, the lead independent non-executive director and investor relations conducted a series of engagements with key shareholders and the feedback is summarised below:
1. |
General feedback Shareholders acknowledged the improvements that have been made on the structure of the STI, specifically, increasing the weighting of the financial KPIs. |
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2. |
ESG metrics |
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a. |
Shareholders suggested the inclusion of ESG metrics in LTI targets. Tiger Brands has a comprehensive ESG strategy (see here of the Sustainability Report). This feedback is being considered as part of the target setting process for FY25. |
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b. |
Shareholders also suggested that consideration be given to a more comprehensive and broader approach to ESG metrics in the STI targets. This feedback is being considered as part of the target setting process for FY25, specifically with regard to environmental sustainability. |
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3. |
Non-resident non-executive director (NED) fees The special resolution relating to non-resident non-executive director fees did not achieve the requisite voting outcome at 65,37% with shareholders questioning the market-relatedness of the non-resident NED fee premium. Tiger Brands considered this feedback and commissioned an independent review and benchmarking of market practice within local and domicile markets and comparative non-resident NED fee approaches within those respective markets. The high-level outcome of the work conducted was that the value paid in ZAR to non-resident non-executive directors was well within our general remuneration practice guidelines. The approach agreed going forward is to implement a non-resident non-executive director fee premium range to allow for flexibility based on prevailing circumstances, specifically, comparative fee positions, local and domicile benchmarks, local and foreign market trends, NED skills and experience and consistency in practices, augmented by shareholder engagement that creates understanding of considerations that drive these fees. |
The remuneration committee is committed to shareholder engagement and to take the following steps, if 25% or more of total votes exercised by shareholders at the AGM are against the remuneration policy or implementation report:
In FY24, the committee executed its duties in line with the approved annual work plan, which included the following activities:
The focus areas are deliberately designed to ensure the committee remains abreast of the latest remuneration market trends and best practice, business needs, as well as our responsibilities to Tiger Brands' people, shareholders and communities to ensure that our remuneration practices enable and support the delivery of the business strategy.
Key focus areas in FY25 will include:
+ Ignite winning performance |
We enlist the services of PwC South Africa for purposes of independent benchmarking, incentive scheme market practice, remuneration trends and survey data. As internal auditors, KPMG is engaged for the purposes of auditing of STI payments. As external auditors, Deloitte reviews and confirms incentive provisions and long-term incentive vesting calculations. The committee is satisfied that PwC, KPMG and Deloitte are independent and remain objective in providing the services.
As required by the King IV™ Code on Corporate Governance, the remuneration policy and implementation report that follow, will be tabled for separate non-binding advisory votes by shareholders at the upcoming AGM in February 2025. As required by the Companies Act, non-executive directors' fees for the coming year will be put to shareholders by way of a special resolution. We are committed to engaging with shareholders as required to discuss issues of concern and therefore, encourage shareholders to provide feedback.
On behalf of the committee, I am satisfied that the remuneration policy is appropriate and I am confident that our remuneration policy has achieved the desired outcomes for FY24 and is aligned with the company's strategic goals and shareholder interests. The remuneration disclosures presented in this report have been made in compliance with the remuneration policy as approved by shareholders. No known deviations from the remuneration policy have been made in the current financial year.
Lucia Swartz
Chairman: Remuneration committee
4 December 2024
Section 2: Overview of remuneration policy
The membership of the Tiger Brands remuneration committee consists of a minimum of three non-executive directors, the majority of whom are independent. The CEO is a permanent invitee to all meetings and other executives attend the meetings by invitation.
The CEO and nominated invitees are not present when matters relating to their own remuneration are discussed. The group company secretary is the secretary of the committee.
The committee meets four times a year and, where necessary, additional meetings may be held. The role of the committee is to provide independent and objective assistance to the board in ensuring that Tiger Brands remunerates fairly, responsibly and transparently to promote the achievement of strategic objectives and positive performance outcomes in the short, medium and long term.
The role of the committee is to provide independent and objective assistance to the board in ensuring that Tiger Brands remunerates fairly, responsibly and transparently to promote the achievement of strategic objectives and positive performance outcomes in the short, medium and long term.
As documented in the remuneration committee terms of reference the duties and responsibilities of the committee are:
The terms of reference are reviewed annually.
Tiger Brands is committed to a total reward offering built on a strong foundation of fair and responsible pay that is linked to our remuneration philosophy of pay for performance. Salaries are benchmarked once a year against the REM channel salary survey to ensure that remuneration decisions are fair and in line with market practice. We also follow a job grading methodology that is consistent and provides a fair and accurate job grade, which allows for proper salary benchmarking.
Our pay progression model strives to fairly reward employees based on performance and market positioning. It enables us to actively manage outlier compensation in a fair and responsible manner and to ensure that differentials that exist are justifiable.
Unjustifiable pay differentials are addressed during the annual reward review process, where we assess and adjust the salaries of unjustifiably underpaid employees, in line with the prevailing mandate. This salary adjustment is generally capped at a predetermined percentage to limit exorbitant increases. Specific focus is given to African, Coloured and female employees as well as employees in roles that are classified as scarce and critical skills.
In addition, we follow a systemic approach in day-to-day decision-making by ensuring individual pay and pay scales are matched to similar roles in the market and guidelines direct decision-makers to ensure that new appointments, promotions and other pay review opportunities are executed in accordance with our set standards and parameters. At every compensation review opportunity, we consider, report and interrogate pay differentials, seen through various lenses, including gender and race. At every compensation decision point, we ensure that these differentials, where they are unjustified, are addressed with a view to continuously narrow such gaps. After each company-wide pay review, these outcomes and trends are reported to the board for approval before implementation. As a result, income differentials have closed significantly since 2018, when dedicated and structured efforts started to be applied. To maintain the focus on fair and responsible pay, Tiger Brands will perform regular analyses of compensation differentials and close gaps accordingly.
The company's remuneration strategy is aligned to the Tiger Brands' people strategy, which is geared to enable the execution of the business strategy and accelerate business performance.
Our remuneration principles have been designed to support the execution of the people strategy and are premised on our belief that great people and superior brands are at the core of our success. Our reward framework is holistic, encompassing the financial elements of reward as well as non-financial aspects such as recognition, development, the work environment, culture and meaningful work.
The following are the key objectives of our remuneration policy:
We have summarised below the various remuneration elements (guaranteed package, short-term incentive and long-term incentive) that Tiger Brands offers at different levels of employment:
Guaranteed package (GP) offered to people on a total remuneration package basis (TRP) comprises base pay, allowances, retirement and medical benefits. It is reviewed annually based on personal performance against annually agreed KPIs in individual performance agreements (IPA), business performance, affordability, behaviours aligned with company values and market competitiveness (national and sector benchmarks).
Benchmarking for executive directors is based on a comparator group of companies. The comparator group is determined using the closeness metric formula, which measures how similar a candidate company is to Tiger Brands and is based on:
Companies included in the comparator group comprise:
Category | Survey type | Comparator group |
Executive directors | Bespoke survey | JSE listed comparator group* |
Public data of South African companies listed on the JSE, based on the closeness metric, is used to determine an appropriate comparator group |
AVI Limited |
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Rest of Exco, senior management and below |
REMchannel® survey | National and consumer goods circles |
* The 2022 comparator group remains suitable for benchmarking purposes | ||
Anchor point | Tiger Brands anchors its pay position competitively against the national market. We aspire to achieve a normal distribution around the anchor point based on individual performance, talent, potential, experience and in certain instances, tenure. We aim to pay employees that fully meet expectations in critical roles at or above the anchor point. The performance-based increases granted annually (including those for executive directors and executive committee members) are managed within the overall salary increase budget and the pay progression model as discussed below. | |
Benefits | Benefits include retirement fund contributions, funeral cover, permanent health insurance, death-in-service cover, medical aid contributions and travel allowances (where applicable). |
The primary intention of the STI is to drive business performance by focusing participants' attention on annual key financial, strategic, functional and personal performance objectives, which are aligned with the long-term business strategy for sustainable value creation. This drives high performance by explicitly creating line-of-sight by linking group, business unit and individual performance.
+ A group performance factor, focused on group financial and non-financial metrics + A business unit performance factor, focused on business unit financial and non-financial metrics + An individual performance factor, focused on individual performance objectives, which allows for differentiation in rewarding high performers |
Payment of an STI is subject to the overriding condition that the group and business unit meets or exceeds the agreed entry threshold in respect of its earnings before interest and tax (EBIT).
Predetermined weightings are applied to each of the performance factors ranging from 50% (threshold performance) to 200% (stretch performance). In respect of the individual performance factor, participants are rated on a rating scale ranging from one (poor performer) to five (exceptional performer).
In FY25, the following ranges of STI awards will apply to the various categories of people covered by this report:
On-target percentage of guaranteed package |
Maximum percentage of guaranteed package (based on the achievement of stretch performance) |
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CEO, CFO and executive directors | 60 | 120 |
Executive committee members | 60 | 120 |
Senior management (EU) | 40 | 80 |
Senior management (EL) | 35 | 70 |
Qualified and experienced specialists and mid-management (DU) | 17,5 | 35 |
Qualified and experienced specialists and mid-management (DL) | 12,5 | 25 |
Administrative, support, technical, skilled and supervisory employees (A to CU band)* | 8,5 | 17 |
* Employees in the bargaining unit are eligible for a 13th cheque, governed under agreement with relevant unions and not included in the STI scheme
The underlying values and weightings for each KPI are set and approved by the remuneration committee in advance of each year to determine parameters for the STI in the form of a balanced scorecard. The STI scorecard for 2025 is simplified so as to ensure sharper focus on key outcomes. Below is the group STI scorecard for FY25 that will be applied to the CEO, CFO, executive directors, executive committee members and other participants:
Strategic objective |
Weighting | Key performance indicator | KPI weighting |
Threshold Score = 50% |
Target Score = 100% |
Stretch Score = 200% |
Performance and growth | 80% | Brand equity | 5% | 75% | 100% | 125% |
Sales volume growth | 5% | 50% | 100% | 150% | ||
EBIT (absolute) | 25% | 87% | 100% | 105% | ||
EBIT (margin) | 15% | 95% | 100% | 108% | ||
Gross margin | 15% | 98% | 100% | 102% | ||
Cash conversion rate | 15% | Cash generated from operations as % of EBITDA |
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75% | 100% | 110% | ||||
Enablers: People and sustainability |
20% | Environmental sustainability: Water and electricity intensities | 5% | % reduction year-on-year | ||
91% | 100% | 109% | ||||
Quality and food safety | 5% | Reduction in complaints year-on-year | ||||
80% | 100% | 120% | ||||
LTI-manufacturing | 5% | 92% | 100% | 110% | ||
Talent pipeline | 5% | % internal leadership appointments (C – F) | ||||
91% | 100% | 109% |
Note 1: The actual targets are not provided as they are linked to budget and considered commercially sensitive information.
Note 2: The targeted percentages for "threshold", "on-target" and "stretch" as set out above per key performance indicator represent the targeted
percentage achievement of the underlying budgeted amounts.
The group, business unit and individual performance weightings applicable are detailed below:
Employee category | Group | Business unit | Individual |
CEO, CFO and executive directors | 80% | 0% | 20% |
Executive committee members: Functional executives | 80% | 0% | 20% |
Executive committee members: Business unit managing directors | 20% | 60% | 20% |
Other participants (Paterson grades A to E band) | 0% to 40% | 40% to 80% | 20% |
From FY24, senior management, executives and executive directors may elect to defer up to 50% of their earned STI into bonus shares, which will then be matched by the company on a one-for-one basis. Both the deferred bonus shares and the company matched shares will be classified as restricted shares, that vest after three years. Further details are presented later in this report.
The LTI is aligned to our reward approach and operating model, taking into consideration the following principles:
Employees in Paterson grade D and above may be eligible to participate in the annual awards of the long-term incentive.
The table below provides further details regarding the performance and restricted shares awarded under the long-term incentive plan:
Instrument | Performance shares | Restricted shares | |||
Employee category | Performance shares award multiple as a % of guaranteed pay |
Employee category | Restricted shares award multiple as a % of guaranteed pay |
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Award mechanism | CEO Note: See table below for current CEO. |
81,3% | CEO | – | |
CFO | 81,3% | CFO | – | ||
Executive committee members | 61,0% | Executive committee members | – | ||
Senior management and below | 10,6% to 27,7% | Senior management and below | 8,2% to 22,9% | ||
Performance multiplier |
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Calculation of award quantum |
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Vesting |
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Performance conditions applicable to performance shares |
HEPS growth (weighted at 50%):
The HEPS calculation is performed on an annual compound basis over the three-year vesting period. Linear vesting to apply between threshold and stretch. ROIC – (weighted at 50%):
The measurement will be the average ROIC compared to the average WACC over the three-year vesting period. Linear vesting to apply between threshold and stretch. Definition of ROIC: Operating income from total operations before impairments and non-operational items (reduced by the group's average tax rate, adjusted for the effect of interest), plus the after-tax share of income from associates as a percentage of average invested capital. Invested capital comprises the book value of total equity (which is inclusive of non-controlling interests), plus long-term and short-term borrowings (including the liability arising from IFRS 16), less the value of cash on hand and cash equivalents. Invested capital is also increased by the reinstatement of any write-offs/impairments related to continuing operations (both historically as well in the current period) which is included in non-operational income of any intangible assets, fixed assets and associates. The average invested capital is determined by calculating the simple average of the aforesaid balances, based on their values at the beginning and end of the relevant financial year. |
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Share price |
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1 +4% for all allocations before December 2023
2 +2% for all allocations before December 2023
Instrument | Conditional shares | Performance shares award multiple as a % of guaranteed pay |
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Award mechanism | For the current CEO, a bespoke LTI vehicle (conditional shares only) has been agreed. | 100% | |
Calculation of award quantum | TGP over 24 months x conditional share award multiple/10-day VWAP for the period immediately ending prior to the announcement of Tjaart’s appointment as CEO. | ||
Vesting | Vesting is subject to the satisfaction of performance conditions over the performance period, ending 31 December 2025 and the CEO remaining in service at vesting date. | ||
Performance conditions applicable to conditional shares |
Operating margins (weighted at 40%):
The measurement will be the average operating margin over the vesting period. Linear vesting to apply between threshold and stretch. ROIC – (weighted at 40%):
The measurement will be the average ROIC compared to the average WACC over the vesting period. Linear vesting to apply between threshold and stretch. Definition of ROIC: Operating income from total operations before impairments and non-operational items (reduced by the group's average tax rate, adjusted for the effect of interest), plus the after-tax share of income from associates as a percentage of average invested capital. Invested capital comprises the book value of total equity (which is inclusive of non-controlling interests), plus long-term and short-term borrowings (including the liability arising from IFRS 16), less the value of cash on hand and cash equivalents. Invested capital is also increased by the reinstatement of any write-offs/impairments related to continuing operations (both historically as well in the current period) which is included in non-operational income of any intangible assets, fixed assets and associates. The average invested capital is determined by calculating the simple average of the aforesaid balances, based on their values at the beginning and end of the relevant financial year. Cash flow (cash conversion) – (weighted at 20%):
The measurement will be the average cash flow conversion over the vesting period (Cash available from operations/EBITDA). Linear vesting to apply between threshold and stretch. |
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Share price |
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As the performance conditions have not been met, the last tranche of the share appreciation rights (SARs) allocated in December 2018 has been forfeited in full. No SARs have been awarded since December 2018.
The following two schemes were established as part of the company's black empowerment strategy:
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Established in 2005 to attract and retain diverse talent |
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+ |
Rights allocated – Tiger Brands shares. Rights are settled after making the required capital contributions to BMT I. For all rights allocated on or before 31 July 2010, settlement may take place at any time after the initial lock-in period, i.e. from 1 January 2015. For all rights allocated after 31 July 2010, the lock-in date varies depending on the date of allocation. The scheme made its final allocation in August 2022 |
+ |
Established in 2005 as part of the company's BEE Phase I empowerment initiative. The trust's resources were enhanced in 2009 under the company's BEE Phase II transaction |
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The trust provides bursaries for tertiary education to dependants of permanently employed black people who might not otherwise be able to afford this cost |
In compliance with the JSE Listings Requirements, the LTIP contains limits setting out the aggregate maximum number of shares that may be settled to all participants as well as the aggregate maximum number of shares to be settled to any one participant. The LTIP rules provide that these limits are not applicable where shares acquired on the JSE are used to settle LTIP awards. Although it has been Tiger’s practice in the past to purchase shares off the market upon settlement of LTIP awards (which ensured that the LTIP did not result in an impact to shareholder value), it is to be noted that, during FY24, Tiger Consumer Brands Limited, a 100% subsidiary of Tiger Brands, acquired 1 104 486 Tiger Brands shares which, as at 30 September 2024, are held as treasury shares. These shares were specifically acquired for purposes of settling shares in terms of the LTIP. On purchase of the treasury shares, shareholder value was favourably impacted. The future utilisation of these shares to settle LTIP awards will, accordingly, result in a dilution to shareholder value.
On 30 September 2024, the aggregate number of shares that may be acquired by participants under the various schemes was 1 816 683 (2023: 2 200 673).
We have a minimum shareholding policy, where senior executives are expected to build up their personal shareholding in the company over a specific period. In the case of the CEO, the target is 200% of guaranteed package while the target for executive directors and members of the executive committee is 100% of guaranteed package. Senior executives who were in service when the policy was adopted in 2016 had six years to build up their shareholding from date of adoption. Senior executives appointed after adoption have six years to build their shareholding from date of appointment. They may use any vesting LTIs or their own resources to acquire these shares.
In order to accelerate the progress towards achieving minimum shareholding, this policy was amended to compel a commitment of a minimum of 30% (thirty percent) of vested long-term incentives towards their shareholding, or such portion required to reach the minimum shareholding, should it be less than 30% below the requirement.
In the case of the MSR not being met, the board retains the overriding discretion to:
An amendment approved and implemented effective in 2024, is the voluntary deferral of up to 50% of the short-term incentive earned by senior managers and executives, into restricted shares (deferred bonus shares). Such a deferral is matched by the company on a one-for-one basis, also in the form of restricted shares. These deferred bonus shares and company matched shares vest after three years. Should an employee's service end on a fault basis, they shall forfeit the company matched portion. Where executives are subject to a minimum shareholding requirement (MSR) and they have not yet achieved the required MSR, these deferred bonus shares and company matched shares will be taken into account as part of their shareholding in Tiger Brands for MSR purposes. Any shares settled upon vesting of the deferred bonus and company matching shares will automatically be committed to the MSR of the executive and held in a restricted account until expiry of the holding period.
The preventative aim of this policy is to remove the incentive for an executive to intentionally manipulate financial results or financial position or organisational information with the intention of financially benefiting from variable remuneration which would otherwise not have been due to such executive. These provisions align the interests of executives with the long-term interests of the organisation as well as shareholders to ensure that irresponsible behaviour is not rewarded.
With respect to malus, if the remuneration committee, in consultation with the board and/or any committee of the board, believes that a trigger event has occurred, it has full discretion to reduce, in part or whole, unvested variable remuneration (i.e. STIs and LTIs) before the end of the vesting or payment period. In the case of clawback, the remuneration committee, in consultation with the board and/or any committee of the board, may implement clawback for the whole or portion of vested variable remuneration in the event of a trigger event occurring over a period of three years from the date on which payment was made of such vested variable remuneration. Trigger events include, but are not limited to:
The variable pay arrangements described above have various potential outcomes. These outcomes could be from zero (minimum) to the expected level of performance outcomes (target) to the maximum potential variable pay outcomes (maximum). In the illustrations presented alongside, it should be noted that:
The above depiction mirrors the compensation of the CEO, expressed in annual terms. As reported in the previous remuneration report, this LTI vehicle is a bespoke conditional share award, associated with specifically agreed performance conditions over the period of service, directly aligned with the company turnaround and performance outcomes agreed with the board.
Senior executives are employed full-time under standard agreements, with a notice period of three months and retirement age of 63. We bind all senior executives by a restraint-of-trade agreement to protect Tiger Brands' interests (including trade secrets, confidential information and customer connections), and to prevent economic prejudice to Tiger Brands, including loss of clients and goodwill. To the extent that executives have access to proprietary business insights and intellectual property, Tiger Brands will enforce the agreement should they join a competitor. The restraint comprises a three-month notice period or three months' special leave (paid as a three-month lump sum based on guaranteed package on termination).
In exceptional circumstances (mainly for the recruitment and retention of critical and/or scarce talent), Tiger Brands will award a sign on/retention payment which will be subject to the following conditions:
Remuneration policy component |
Involuntary termination (i.e. resignation) |
Involuntary termination (retrenchment, retirement, death) |
Guaranteed package | Paid up to last day of service | Paid up to last day of service including notice period, where applicable. |
Medical aid | Benefit continues to last day of service | Benefit continues up to last day of service. Employees who qualify for post-retirement medical aid funding will continue to receive the employer contribution with effect from their normal retirement date. |
Retirement and risk plans | Employer contributions paid until last day of service. Employee is entitled to the value of the investment, but all risk benefits cease on termination of service. | |
Other benefits | Not applicable | Severance package in respect of retrenchments – two weeks for every year of service in terms of the relevant rules. |
Short-term incentives | No pro rata bonus paid | Pro rata STI payment, based on achievement of specified financial and strategic targets for the period and a personal performance agreement being in place at the date of exit. |
Long-term incentives | All unvested awards lapse | Depending on the nature of the instrument and reasons for termination, a participant may retain all units or a pro rata portion. Accelerated vesting and settlement of retained units may apply in certain circumstances. |
Under a formal policy, an executive is limited to one substantive outside directorship. The chairman of the Tiger Brands board and the nominations committee are required to authorise these appointments based on a recommendation from the CEO. Other than in respect of their appointment to the boards of associate companies, directors' fees under this policy may be retained by the individual. During the reporting period, none of the executive committee members had external directorships.
Fees and approval process
Non-executive directors are paid an annual retainer that reflects their overall contribution and input to the company, and not just for attendance at board and committee meetings. Fees are reviewed annually and increases are implemented in March after approval at the relevant AGM.
Benchmarking is conducted on an annual basis to benchmark these fees against South African companies listed on the JSE, based on market capitalisation, turnover and total assets. As these are similar metrics to that of the benchmark group for executive directors it was decided that from FY20, in line with King IVTM and in terms of the current requirements of the organisation, a single comparator group be adopted for the non-executive directors and executive directors' remuneration benchmarking. The comparator group is detailed on here.
The special resolution relating to non-resident non-executive director fees did not achieve the requisite voting outcome (65,37%), with shareholders not having clarity on the basis for the non-resident NED fee premium to resident NED fees. Tiger Brands considered this feedback and commissioned an independent review and benchmarking of market practice and comparative non-resident NED fee approaches. Shareholders were engaged around this matter during 2024. The agreed approach is to implement a non-resident non-executive director fee premium range to allow for flexibility based on prevailing circumstances, augmented by shareholder engagement that create understanding of considerations that drive these fees, specifically comparative fee positions, local and domicile benchmarks, local and foreign market trends, NED skills and experience and consistency in practices.
Targeted remuneration for the 12-month period ended 29 February 2024 was determined through a fee benchmarking process against our selected comparator group. Non-resident non-executive directors are paid a premium in comparison to resident directors, as is common practice in our comparator group, as well as wider JSE companies with non-resident non-executive directors. Tiger Brands' premium for non-resident non-executive directors is well below the midpoint of both these comparator groups. The chairman does not receive any additional remuneration for participating in committees of the board. Non-executive directors who perform services outside the scope of their ordinary duties will not receive additional remuneration. Shareholder approval will be sought for increasing non-executive directors' fees, including fees paid for attending special board meetings. Details of proposed non-executive directors' fees effective from 1 March 2024 appear in the notice of AGM of shareholders to be held on 20 February 2025. Details of non-executive directors' fees paid in the review period appear here.
This remuneration policy is subject to a non-binding advisory vote by shareholders at the upcoming AGM.
Section 3: Implementation report
In this section of the remuneration report we explain the implementation of our remuneration policy, providing details of the remuneration paid to our executive directors and members of the executive committee for the financial year ended 30 September 2024.
In 2023, the remuneration committee approved a 5% annual increase effective December 2023. This excludes the negotiated increases for bargaining unit employees and targeted increases to reward exceptional performance, retain critical skills and execute day-to-day internal mobility practices, such as promotions, transfers and other deployments during the financial year.
The following increases to guaranteed packages were implemented in the reporting period for executive directors. New amounts were effective as indicated below:
1 April 2024 to 30 Nov 2024 |
1 Nov 2023 to 30 Nov 2024 |
% increase | |
Executive directors | |||
TN Kruger1 | 11 500 000 | 11 000 000 | 4,5% |
1 Dec 2023 to 30 Nov 2024 |
1 Dec 2022 to 30 Nov 2023 |
% increase | |
TA Govender2 | 7 033 910 | 6 790 790 | 3,6% |
1 Tjaart Kruger was appointed 1 November 2023. The board performed an interim salary review and considering parity as well as personal performance, approved a 4,5% increase in his salary effective 1 April 2024
2 Thushen Govender was appointed as CFO on 1 January 2024. His prior year compensation reflected here is relevant to his previous role
During September 2024, the board approved the extension of Tjaart Kruger's contract as CEO for a further three years from expiry of his current contract, up to 31 December 2028. The terms of this extension are as follows:
Guaranteed package | Subject to policy and annual review by the board in line with performance and compensation benchmarking. |
Short-term incentive | Subject to prevailing STI rules, no change from current on-target STI of 60% x GP |
Current long-term incentive (conditional share) plan | The current two-year long-term incentive allocation will remain in place and will vest on 31 December 2025, at which point shares will be purchased in the market and the holding period of 12 months will apply prior to final vesting at the end of 2026 (31 December 2026). |
Future long-term incentive plan awards |
Future LTI awards shall be based on the same bespoke vehicle and performance conditions established in November 2023. Performance conditions and targets shall be subject to review by RemCom after three years calculated from 1 November 2023. Tranches equivalent to 100% x GP shall be awarded in December 2025, 2026 and 2027. |
Termination conditions | At the end of the extended fixed-term contract, Tjaart will be treated as a retiree (good leaver) in line with the Tiger Brands Limited 2013 Share Plan rules and the vesting of LTIs will not be prorated (i.e. each LTI award will vest in full, subject to performance conditions after three years). |
The services of the previous CEO, Noel Doyle, terminated under a mutual separation agreement with the board. His exit was subject to various conditions, including that he remains bound by restraint of trade conditions for a period of six (6) months after his formal termination. Noel Doyle's services terminated on 31 March 2024.
The financial aspects of the mutual separation agreement included:
Severance payment (two weeks per year service) | 3 945 533 |
Three months’ notice pay | 2 910 180 |
Six months’ restraint of trade | 5 820 360 |
Outstanding long-term incentives were treated in terms of the rules of the scheme. Unvested share awards were reduced pro rata in relation to Noel Doyle's service period relative to the award period and shares shall vest according to the existing rules. There was no accelerated vesting of awards.
As indicated in the policy section, the STI for executive directors is based on the combination of a group performance factor and individual performance component.
The group performance factor (80% overall weighting) for executive directors is weighted according to the table below. Results for FY24 were as follows:
STI achievement | Threshold1 | Target1 | Stretch1 | Outcome | Weight | Weighted result |
||||||
Brand equity |
|
89% | 100% | 111% | Not achieved | 5% | 0% | |||||
EBIT (Absolute) |
|
95% | 100% | 105% | Threshold | 25% | 15,82% | |||||
EBIT (Margin) |
|
93%2 | 100% | 107%2 | Not achieved | 20% | 0% | |||||
Gross margin |
|
96%2 | 100% | 103%2 | Not achieved | 20% | 0% | |||||
Working capital management |
|
86% | 100% | 143% | Stretch | 10% | 20% | |||||
Quality and food safety |
|
83% | 100% | 117% | Not achieved | 5% | 0% | |||||
Safety (LTI-manufacturing) |
|
94% | 100% | 107% | Stretch | 5% | 10% | |||||
Carbon emissions |
|
80% | 100% | 140% | Stretch | 5% | 10% | |||||
Talent pipeline |
|
75% | 100% | 125% | Stretch | 5% | 10% | |||||
|
100% | 65,82% |
1 |
The targeted percentages for "threshold", "target" and "stretch" as set out above per KPI represent the targeted percentage achievement of the underlying budgeted amounts. Calculation of achievement % is applied on a linear basis if the actual result falls between "threshold" and "target" or between "target" and "stretch" |
2 |
Erratum: Due to a printing error, these values were marginally incorrectly stated in the 2023 report. The above values are correct and in accordance with approved targets. The error had no adverse impact on reported achievement |
The individual performance factor (20% overall weighting) for executive directors is weighted according to the table below. The results for FY24 were as follows:
TN Kruger | TA Govender | |||||||
Key performance indicators | Not met | Partially met | Met | Exceeded | Not met | Partially met | Met | Exceeded |
Individual KPIs |
|
|
|
|
Name | GP1 | On-target % |
Actual group performance factor % x weighting (80%)2 |
Actual personal performance factor % x weighting (20%)3 |
2024 STI (rand) |
2023 STI (rand) |
|||
TN Kruger4 | 11 500 000 | x | 60% | x | 52,66% | + | 29% | 5 164 661 | n/a |
TA Govender | 7 033 910 | x | 60% | x | 52,66% | + | 29% | 3 446 112 | 0 |
1 Annual guaranteed package in rand as at 30 September 2024
2 Actual group performance factor determined as: 65,82% x 80% = 52,66%
3 Actual personal performance factor determined as: CEO: 145% x 20% = 29% and CFO: 145% x 20% = 29%
4 Tjaart's STI is pro rated to 11 months as his start date was 1 November 2023
In FY24, performance shares were awarded to executive directors, executive committee members, senior management and middle management.
Long-term incentive awards made during the year to executive directors are set out below:
In accordance with the Tiger Brands 2013 share plan
LTI personal performance multiplier1 |
Performance shares | |||||
Name | GP | Award % | Number2 | Face value | Expected value | |
TA Govender | 100% | 7 033 910 | 81,3% | 30 240 | 5 718 988 | 7 034 355 |
1 The personal performance multiplier is used to modify the standard quantum of performance shares and restricted shares, based on an individual's personal sustained performance and potential. This is a percentage ranging from 0% to 150%
2 Allocated on 18 December 2023 at VWAP of R189,12
In accordance with the bespoke allocation of shares to Tjaart Kruger
Conditional shares | |||||
Name | GP | Award % | Number1 | Face value | Expected value |
TN Kruger | 11 000 000 (year 1) + 11 550 000 (year 2) |
100% | 149 700 | 22 499 910 | 27 674 889 |
1 Allocated on 18 December 2023 at VWAP of R150,30 calculated for the 10-day period ending immediately prior to the announcement of Tjaart's appointment as CEO
The outcome for awards due to vest in December 2024 and whose performance conditions ended by 30 September 2024, are shown below. This applies to all eligible participants.
Performance vesting shares granted in December 2021 and vesting in December 2024
Targets | Weighting | Threshold (25% vesting) |
Target 100% vesting) |
Stretch (200% vesting) |
Actual achievement |
Performance outcome % vesting |
Headline earnings per share (HEPS) | 50% | CPI + GDP | CPI + GDP + 2% | CPI + GDP + 4% | 5 246,6 cents | 200 |
Return on invested capital (ROIC) | 50% | WACC + 1% | WACC + 2% | WACC + 5% | 15,38% | 85,81 |
Total | 142,91 |
Share appreciation rights granted in FY19 – third tranche
Targets | Weighting | Minimum target |
Actual achievement |
Performance outcome % vesting |
Headline earnings per share (HEPS) | 50% | 9 074,60 cents | ![]() |
0% |
Return on invested capital (ROIC) | 50% | 14,02% | ![]() |
0% |
Total | 0% |
|
|
|
The CEO is not subject to the MSR policy by virtue of his contract term. The CEO is new to the role as a prescribed officer and will be disclosed in subsequent reports.
Name | Date of appointment to the executive committee |
GP1 | Number of shares held |
Original value of shares held |
Current value of shares held2 |
Original value a % of GP |
Target % of GP |
Years remaining to meet target3 |
CXO1 | 5 December 2016 | 4 495 860 | 2 373 | 1 638 700 | 1 131 387 | 38 | 100 | 1 |
CXO6 | 6 January 2020 | 6 370 760 | 17 826 | 3 302 231 | 4 153 458 | 52 | 100 | 4 |
CXO8 | 1 May 2019 | 5 015 970 | 13 423 | 2 486 584 | 3 127 559 | 50 | 100 | 3 |
1 GP as at 30 September 2024
2 Value calculated with reference to the closing price of a Tiger Brands share as at 30 September 2024, i.e. R233,00
3 A three-year extension to reach MSR was provided to executives who were in service at time of the extension (May 2021)
Payments made to Noel Doyle under the mutual separation agreement are disclosed on here of this report. As a result of the restructuring of the Tiger Brands executive committee, which commenced in December 2023, the positions of chief growth officer: Grains and chief growth officer: Consumer, became redundant. Yokesh Maharaj, chief growth officer: Grains exited the organisation as a result and was treated in accordance with our retrenchment policy.
There were no deviations from the remuneration policy in the financial year.
The following tables disclose total remuneration received and receivable by executive directors and executive management for the period 1 October 2023 to 30 September 2024:
TN Kruger (from appointment date 1/11/2023) |
TA Govender (from appointment date 1/01/2024) |
|||
Remuneration element | FY24 (R’000) |
FY23 (R’000) |
FY24 (R’000) |
FY23 (R’000) |
Basic salary | 10 333 | 4 921 | ||
---|---|---|---|---|
Retirement funding | 248 | |||
Other benefits | 106 | |||
Guaranteed package | 10 333 | 5 275 | ||
Short-term incentive | 5 165 | 3 446 | ||
SARs | ||||
FY22 Long-term performance shares1 | 5 005 | |||
Other | ||||
Total remuneration | 15 498 | 13 726 |
1 FY22 performance shares awarded in December 2021 and will vest on 15 December 2024. The shares will vest at a multiple of 142,91%. Values indicative and based on the Tiger Brands closing share price on 30 September 2024 (R 233,00)
NP Doyle (until termination date 31/03/2024) |
DS Sita (until termination date 31/12/2023) |
|||
Remuneration element | FY24 (R’000) |
FY23 (R’000) |
FY24 (R’000) |
FY23 (R’000) |
Basic salary | 4 876 | 9 427 | 1 656 | 6 527 |
---|---|---|---|---|
Retirement funding | 806 | 1 545 | 82 | 330 |
Other benefits | – | – | 60 | 251 |
Guaranteed package | 5 682 | 10 972 | 1 798 | 7 108 |
Short-term incentive | 2 5033 | – | – | – |
SARs | – | – | – | |
FY21 Long-term performance shares1 | – | 10 364 | 5 479 | |
FY22 Long-term performance shares2 | 12 428 | |||
Other | 12 6764 | – | ||
Total remuneration | 33 289 | 21 336 | 1 798 | 12 587 |
1 FY21 performance shares awarded in December 2020 and vested on 4 December 2023
2 FY22 performance shares awarded in December 2021 and will vest on 15 December 2024. The shares will vest at a multiple of 142,91%. Values
indicative and based on the Tiger Brands closing share price on 30 September 2024 (R233,00)
3 Noel's departure was treated under specific mutual separation terms which included eligibility in accordance with Tiger Brands short-term incentives rules
4 See here for a breakdown of the termination payments made to Noel Doyle, as also disclosed in the FY23 report
Key | FY24 (R’000) |
FY23 (R’000) |
CXO1 | 9 891,4 | 6 371 |
---|---|---|
CXO19 | 3 228,1 | |
CXO16 | 3 172,8 | |
CXO11 | 6 438,2 | 4 577 |
CXO14 | 11 422,5 | 5 092 |
CXO20 | 5 318,1 | |
CXO21 | 2 443,3 | |
CXO3 | 12 473,5 | 10 371 |
CXO18 | 5 638,9 | |
CXO6 | 15 909,5 | 9 685 |
CXO2 | 1 887,5 | 5 486 |
CXO15 | 1 718,0 | 6 728 |
CXO4 | 2 833,9 | 6 650 |
CXO17 | 3 595,6 | |
CXO8 | 10 721,5 | 6 865 |
Total | 96 382,5 | 61 825 |
Notes:
CXO2 resigned 29/2/2024
CXO4 retrenched 31/12/2023. Remuneration includes severance pay
CXO11 appointed 1 January 2023
CXO14 appointed 1 December 2022
CXO15 moved into CFO role on 01/01/2024. Previous role remuneration reflected up to date of promotion, see table here for remuneration as CFO
CXO16 appointed to Exco on 01/05/2024
CXO17 appointed to Exco on 01/02/2024
CXO18 appointed to Exco on 01/02/2024
CXO19 appointed to Exco on 01/02/2024
CXO20 appointed to Exco on 01/02/2024
CXO21 appointed to Exco on 01/02/2024; resigned 30/09/2024
Disclosure of the quantum and value of awards for the CEO and CFO outstanding at the beginning and end of the reporting period, as well as new awards made in the period (provided in the tables here), with the cash value of awards settled during the reporting period indicated in the value-based tables:
Name and awards | Award date |
Vesting date | Grant
price (ZAR) |
Opening number |
Granted during the year |
Forfeited during the year |
Performance condition achieved |
Settled during the year |
Closing number |
Face value at award (ZAR) |
Cash received (ZAR) |
Value of shares acquired (ZAR) |
Closing fair value vesting (ZAR) |
TN Kruger1 | |||||||||||||
Conditional share award | 18/12/2023 | 31/12/2025 | – | – | 149 700 | – | – | – | 149 700 | 22 499 910 | – | – | 32 942 982 |
Total | – | – | 149 700 | – | – | – | 149 700 | 22 499 910 | – | – | 32 942 982 |
1 Tjaart Kruger's share award is a bespoke conditional share award, associated with specifically agreed performance conditions over the period of service, to align with outcomes agreed with the board
Name and awards | Award date |
Vesting date | Grant
price (ZAR) |
Opening number |
Granted during the year |
Forfeited during the year |
Performance condition achieved |
Settled during the year |
Closing number |
Face value at award (ZAR) |
Cash received (ZAR) |
Value of shares acquired (ZAR) |
Closing fair value vesting (ZAR) |
TA Govender1 | |||||||||||||
FY22 restricted shares | 15/12/2021 | 15/12/2024 | – | 16 110 | – | – | – | – | 16 110 | 2 931 537 | – | – | 3 733 976 |
FY22 performance shares | 15/12/2021 | 15/12/2024 | – | 5 370 | – | – | – | – | 5 370 | 977 179 | – | – | 1 244 659 |
FY23 performance shares | 19/12/2022 | 19/12/2025 | – | 24 720 | – | – | – | – | 24 720 | 5 179 334 | – | – | 5 442 355 |
FY24 performance shares | 18/12/2023 | 18/12/2026 | – | – | 30 240 | – | – | – | 30 240 | 5 718 988 | – | – | 6 326 208 |
Total | – | 46 200 | 30 240 | – | – | – | 76 440 | 14 807 038 | – | – | 16 747 198 |
1 Thushen Govender was appointed as CFO on 1 January 2024
Name and awards | Award date |
Vesting date | Grant
price (ZAR) |
Opening number |
Granted during the year |
Forfeited during the year |
Performance condition achieved |
Settled during the year |
Closing number |
Face value at award (ZAR) |
Cash received (ZAR)2 |
Value of shares acquired (ZAR) |
Closing fair value vesting (ZAR)3 |
NP Doyle1 | |||||||||||||
FY21 performance shares | 04/12/2020 | 04/12/2023 | – | 59 930 | – | – | 7 611 | 67 541 | – | – | 12 495 085 | – | – |
FY22 performance shares | 15/12/2021 | 15/12/2024 | – | 69 700 | – | 16 359 | – | – | 53 341 | 9 706 462 | – | – | 12 363 377 |
FY23 performance shares | 19/12/2022 | 19/12/2025 | – | 64 530 | – | 36 891 | – | – | 27 639 | 5 790 923 | – | – | 6 085 002 |
FY19 SARs | 06/12/2018 | 06/12/2023 | 254,79 | 18 897 | – | 18 897 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
Total | 213 057 | – | 72 147 | 7 611 | 67 541 | 80 980 | 15 497 385 | 12 495 085 | – | 18 448 379 |
1 As reported in the 2023 annual report, Noel Doyle stepped down as CEO and his services officially ended on 31 March 2024
2 These amounts reflect the settled value of vested share awards
3 Number of shares x share price or expected value
Name and awards | Award date |
Vesting date | Grant
price (ZAR) |
Opening number |
Granted during the year |
Forfeited during the year |
Performance condition achieved |
Settled during the year |
Closing number |
Face value at award (ZAR) |
Cash received (ZAR) |
Value of shares acquired (ZAR) |
Closing fair value vesting (ZAR) |
DS Sita1 | |||||||||||||
FY21 performance shares | 04/12/2020 | 04/12/2023 | – | 31 680 | – | – | 4 023 | 35 703 | – | – | – | – | – |
FY22 performance shares | 15/12/2021 | 15/12/2024 | – | 9 220 | – | 9 220 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
FY23 performance shares | 19/12/2022 | 19/12/2025 | – | 41 880 | – | 41 880 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
FY22 restricted shares | 15/12/2021 | 15/12/2024 | – | 72 540 | – | 72 540 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
Total | 155 320 | 123 640 | 4 023 | 35 703 | 6 605 055 | – | – |
1 As reported in the 2023 annual report, Deepa Sita resigned as CFO and her services ended on 31 December 2023. All unvested awards have been forfeited
Prior to his appointment as chief financial officer, TA Govender was awarded the following shares in terms of the Black Managers Trust Scheme:
Name and awards | Award date |
Vesting date | Opening number |
Granted during the year |
Forfeited during the year |
Settled during the year |
Closing number |
Face value at award1 (ZAR) |
Cash received (ZAR) |
Value of shares acquired (ZAR) |
Closing fair value vesting (ZAR)2 |
TA Govender | |||||||||||
Tiger Brands share allocation | 31/01/2022 | 31/01/2025 | 2 333 | – | – | – | 2 333 | 316 378 | – | – | 467 860 |
31/01/2026 | 2 333 | – | – | – | 2 333 | 316 378 | – | – | 467 860 | ||
31/01/2027 | 2 334 | – | – | – | 2 334 | 316 514 | – | – | 468 060 | ||
Adcock Ingram share allocation3 | 31/01/2022 | 31/01/2025 | 1 983 | – | – | – | 1 983 | 75 156 | – | – | 122 252 |
31/01/2026 | 1 983 | – | – | – | 1 983 | 75 156 | – | – | 122 252 | ||
31/01/2027 | 1 984 | – | – | – | 1 984 | 75 194 | – | – | 122 314 | ||
Oceana share allocation3 | 31/01/2022 | 31/01/2025 | 603 | – | – | – | 603 | 33 081 | – | – | 35 975 |
31/01/2026 | 604 | – | – | – | 604 | 33 135 | – | – | 36 035 | ||
31/01/2027 | 604 | – | – | – | 604 | 33 135 | – | – | 36 035 | ||
Total | 14 761 | – | – | – | 14 761 | 1 274 127 | – | – | 1 878 643 |
1 | Calculated with reference to the market value of an allocated share (less the amount of the capital contribution) as at the date of the award |
2 | Calculated with reference to the market value of an allocated share (less the amount of the capital contribution) as at year end (30 September 2024) |
3 | In addition to the award of the Tiger Brands shares, the executive was also awarded Adcock Ingram and Oceana shares (as a consequence of the unbundling by Tiger Brands of its interests in Adcock Ingram and Oceana, the Tiger Brands Black Managers Trust, as Tiger Brands shareholder, also became a shareholder of shares in Adcock Ingram and Oceana). Participants in the Trust are, consequently, also awarded shares in these two companies when awarded Tiger Brands shares |
DS Sita was awarded shares in terms of the Black Managers Trust Scheme during the financial year ended 30 September 2021.
Name and awards | Award date |
Vesting date | Opening number |
Granted during the year |
Forfeited during the year |
Settled during the year |
Closing number |
Face value at award (ZAR) |
Cash received (ZAR) |
Value of shares acquired (ZAR) |
Closing fair value vesting (ZAR) |
DS Sita (left service 31 Dec 2023) | |||||||||||
Tiger Brands share allocation | 31/01/2021 | 31/01/2024 | – | 2 333 | 2 333 | – | – | – | – | – | – |
31/01/2025 | – | 2 333 | 2 333 | – | – | – | – | – | – | ||
31/01/2026 | – | 2 334 | 2 334 | – | – | – | – | – | – | ||
Adcock Ingram share allocation1 | 31/01/2021 | 31/01/2024 | – | 1 983 | 1 983 | – | – | – | – | – | – |
31/01/2025 | – | 1 983 | 1 983 | – | – | – | – | – | – | ||
31/01/2026 | – | 1 984 | 1 984 | – | – | – | – | – | – | ||
Oceana share allocation1 | 31/01/2021 | 31/01/2024 | – | 603 | 603 | – | – | – | – | – | – |
31/01/2025 | – | 604 | 604 | – | – | – | – | – | – | ||
31/01/2026 | – | 604 | 604 | – | – | – | – | – | – | ||
Total | – | 14 761 | 14 761 | – | – | – | – | – | – |
1 | In addition to the award of the Tiger Brands shares, the executive was also awarded Adcock Ingram and Oceana shares (as a result of the unbundling by Tiger Brands of its interests in Adcock Ingram and Oceana, the Tiger Brands Black Managers Trust, as Tiger Brands shareholder, also became a shareholder of shares in Adcock Ingram and Oceana). Participants in the Trust are, consequently, also awarded shares in these two companies when awarded Tiger Brands shares |
The non-executive directors' remuneration paid for the year ended 30 September 2024 is disclosed below, excluding VAT in rand:
Committee | MO Ajukwu | FNJ Braeken | CH Fernandez | GJ Fraser- Moleketi |
GA Klintworth | TE Mashilwane | M Sello | S Sithole | LA Swartz | OM Weber | DG Wilson |
Notes | 2 | 1 | |||||||||
Board fees | 1 103 195 | 1 318 660 | 2 342 200 | 827 396 | 557 357 | 490 442 | 490 442 | 490 442 | 1 103 195 | 490 442 | |
Audit committee fees | 492 720 | 219 046 | 219 046 | 388 560 | |||||||
Remuneration committee, nomination and governance committee fees | 72 774 | 63 282 | 129 412 | 277 141 | 291 097 | 64 706 | |||||
Social, ethics and transformation committee fees | 268 180 | 201 135 | 228 693 | 119 224 | 60 924 | ||||||
Risk and sustainability committee fees | 390 568 | 195 284 | 292 926 | 340 329 | 390 568 | 173 633 | |||||
Investment committee fees | 127 490 | 40 312 | 141 104 | 127 490 | 98 519 | ||||||
Extraordinary fees in respect of special board meeting | 116 566 | 116 566 | 50 680 | 58 283 | 25 340 | 50 680 | 25 340 | 50 680 | 116 566 | 25 340 | |
Total FY24 | 1 878 509 | 2 323 495 | 2 392 880 | 1 379 740 | 1 134 029 | 1 219 721 | 786 298 | 879 186 | 2 028 916 | 1 241 200 | |
Total FY23 | 1 825 344 | 2 129 798 | 1 098 975 | 2 275 076 | 1 825 344 | 996 215 | 1 160 204 | 320 744 | 638 303 | 1 961 216 | 1 031 494 |
Notes
1. GA Klintworth resigned 31 May 2024.
2. CH Fernandez resigned 10 October 2023.